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RIGHT OF CORPORATE SURETY TO SET OFF PAYMENT UNDER
DEPOSIT BOND AGAINST LIABILITY ON FIDELITY BOND--The growth

of the corporate surety business has presented an increasing number
of perplexing legal problems. Among these is the right of a corporate surety to set off a claim it holds against an insolvent bank. One
phase of this problem was recently presented to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in a case whose facts follow: I A Philadelphia bank
obtained from the National Surety Company a $5o,ooo fidelity bond
indemnifying the bank against loss occasioned through the dishonest
acts of employees. Later, upon application by the bank, the surety
company executed its deposit bond for $io,ooo in favor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to assure the repayment of its deposits
held in the bank. Through the dishonesty of employees, the bank
suffered a loss in excess of $5o,ooo, and by reason thereof became
insolvent. The surety company thereupon paid the commonwealth
$Io,ooo, the amount of its deposit in the bank. The Secretary of
Banking, in possession of the insolvent bank, sued the surety company
for $50,000, the amount of the fidelity bond. The defendant surety
company paid $40,ooo and claimed it was entitled to a set-off to the
extent of the $io,ooo paid by it to the commonwealth, alleging that
there were sufficient funds in the hands of the Secretary of Banking
to pay the commonwealth's claim in full (a fact assumed throughout
this note). The lower court entered judgment for the defendant,
allowing the set-off. Upon appeal the judgment was reversed.
There are two major questions involved in the case. First, has
the defendant the right to set-off by virtue of the specific contract of
indemnity contained in the application by the bank for the deposit
bond? Secondly, has the commonwealth a priority over the other
depositors and creditors of the bank; and, if it has, may the defendant, which has paid the claim of the commonwealth, set off the amount
of that payment by virtue of a right in the defendant to be subrogated
to the rights of the commonwealth?
In dealing with the first question, it must be conceded that the
status of the parties became fixed as of the date the Secretary took
over the bank.2 It should also be conceded that no claim accruing in
the defendant's favor, which arose subsequent to the date of insolvency, could be set off by the defendant againsi a claim in favor of the
plaintiff existing at the time of insolvency. It therefore is apparent
that, in order to allow the set-off, it must be proved that the defendant's claim arose prior to, or simultaneously with, the failure of the
'South Philadelphia State Bank v. National Surety Co., 288 Pa. 3oo, 135
Aft. 748 (1927).
'Miller's Appeal, 35 Pa. 481 (i86o); Dean's Appeal, 98 Pa. 101, 104
(188); Chipman v. Bank, 120 Pa. 86, 13 AtI. 707 (1888) ; Oyster v. Short,
177 Pa. 589, 35 AtI. 686 (I86).
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bank. It becomes necessary to look at the indemnity contract, contained in the application by the bank for the deposit bond, in order to
ascertain the true nature and time of origin of the claim asserted by
the defendant. The bank therein agreed that, if the bond should be
issued to protect the commonwealth, it (the bank) would "at all times
indemnify and keep indemnified the [surety] company, and save it
harmless from and against all claims, demands and liabilities . .
of every kind aid nature which it shall from time to time sustain or
incur
by reason or in consequence of having executed said
bond, and will pay over, reimburse and make good to the company

.all
liability

sums and amounts of money to meet every claim, demand,

.
against it by reason of the execution of the bond
applied for and before the company shall be required to pay thereunder."
It can well be argued (in harmony with the lower court's decision) that it was not the payment of the commonwealth's claim which
gave rise to the defendant's right to set-off, but that that right arose
prior thereto under the indemnity contract. It is a significant fact
that the bank specifically agreed in writing to save the defendant
harmless against all claims, demands and liabilities by reason of the
commonwealth's $io,ooo deposit. Thus the defendant need not rely
upon the implied contract of indemnity which always inures to the
benefit of a surety, for it has an express covenant setting forth its
rights in connection with its obligation under the deposit bond. This
contract was in existence several years prior to the insolvency, and by
construing it we see clearly that the very minute the defendant became
liable to the commonwealth, the defendant acquired a definite claim
against the bank under the covenant. To ascertain when the defendant became liable to the commonwealth, it is important to note that
in the deposit bond the defendant assumed, "as principal," an immediate liability upon which judgment might at once have been entered
by any attorney of record in favor of the commonwealth.'
The very
moment the Secretary took possession of the bank, the bank became
legally unable to pay the deposit of the commonwealth, and at that
moment it became due and payable. Thus, under the deposit bond,
the defendant's liability to the commonwealth arose, at the latest,
when the bank was taken over by the Secretary; and under the indemnity contract (which contained the engagement to indemnify "before
the defendant shall be required to pay thereunder") the defendant
simultaneously therewith acquired a definite claim against the bank.
Having in the above manner established the existence of a claim

The deposit bond in part reads: "The said surety holds itself bound, as
principal, for any debts arising thereunder . . . and agrees to answer for the
same without regard to and independently of any action taken against said . . .
bank and whether said bank be first pursued or not. And further, that said
surety hereby authorizes and empowers any attorney of any court of record
in Pennsylvania or elsewhere
. . . "to . . . confess judgment against it, in favor
of the Commonwealth
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at the date of insolvency, it becomes necessary to turn to the authorities to determine whether or not such a claim can be set off by the
defendant. The law has been generally stated to be: 4 "If the principal becomes insolvent after the debt is due and before it is paid, his
surety has an iminediate equity against him, and actual payment need
not be made by the surety to enable him to sustain an action to compel
payment of the debt out of his principal's assets. Also, on the
insolvency of the principal, the surety may retain moneys of the principal in his hands or the amount of his own indebtedness to the
principal as a fund for his indemnity; and an assignee of the debtor
has, in such case, no better right to such fund than his assignor would
have." 5 The case of Wagner v. Burnham 6 is in point. There the
plaintiff was trustee in bankruptcy for an insolvent contractor. The
trustee sued the owner of a building for moneys due the contractor
from work done thereon. The defendant set up as counterclaim the
amount of certain liens filed on the building by sub-contractors which
he had paid subsequent to the adjudication in bankruptcy. The court,
in allowing the set-off, said: "It is' contended that the defendant's
claim was contingent

. . . at the date of adjudication in bank-

ruptcy and, therefore, cannot be allowed in set-off. This view, however, we think, entirely overlooks the nature of the defendant's claim.
* At the date of the adjudication, the bankrupt was indebted to
the sub-contractors on the claims which were subsequently paid by
the defendant. The primary liability rested upon the bankrupt. By
the law of this state, however, the sub-contractors had a lien against
the property of the defendant." 7 The exact question was presented
to a federal court which said: 8 "A bank may set off a depositor's
debt due it against the deposit debt to him, and the great weight of
authority is that a depositor may set off his deposit credit against his
R. C. L. ii 5.
"'If the principal is insolvent equity recognizes the right of the surety
to retain any funds of the principal in his hands even as against an assignee
of the principal, and the principal will not be allowed to recover from the
surety without first indemnifying the latter": 32 CYc. 245.
'224 Pa. 586, 589, 73 At. 99o (igo9).
'Accord: In re Dillon, ioo Fed. 627 (D. C. Mass. I9OO), which includes
strong dictum to the effect that a surety who paid the debt of his bankrupt
principal, after adjudication in bankruptcy, may- set off the amount so paid
against his own debt to the bankrupt. Jack v. Klepser, 196 Pa 187, 46 Att.
479 (igoo) held that where a note given by a depositor to a bank is not due
at the time of the failure 'of the bank, the depositor may, after the note has
become due, set off the amount of his deposit against the note. Other authorities to the effect that the defendant as surety had the right to retain out of
the moneys due the principal, $io,ooo for his indemnity, are: Mervin v. Austin, 58 Conn. 22, 18 Atl. io;9 (1889); Abbey v. Van Campen, I Freem. Ch.
273 (Miss. 1844); Walker v. Dicks, 8o N. C. 263 (I879); Beaver v. Beaver,
23 Pa. 167 (1854); Craighead v. Swartz, 219 Pa. 149, 67 Atl. 1003 (1907);
Mattingly v. Sutton, ig W. Va. 19 (188i); 27 AM. & ENG. ENCYC. oF LAw
(2d ed.) 478; I BRANDT SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (3d ed., i9o5) § 249.
'Fidelity Co. v. Duke, 293 Fed. 661 (C. C. A. 9th, 1923).
'21
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own deposit debt to an insolvent bank.9 Doubtless it will be conceded
that set-off does not depend upon variety of contract debt or upon
the character of parties. Hence a debt upon a contract of suretyship
may be set off equally with a debt by contract of deposit, and a suretyship company for hire may assert set-off equally with any other character of surety." 10
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not allow the
set-off in the instant case. The court, by disregarding suretyship law,
reasoned that any right the defendant acquired under the indemnity
contract could only have resulted in a general judgment against the
bank, a judgment for breach of covenant and not a judgment for a
deposit. From this the court concluded that there could be no setoff by virtue of the covenant, since it could not be known, until final
accounting, how much would be applicable to the claim based on the
covenant.11 There is good authority in point which justifies the
court's decision, if not all of its reasoning. This view is based upon
the theory that the defendant's claim under the indemnity contract did
not represent a definite claim at the date of insolvency, and to allow
the set-off, therefore, would give the defendant a preference to which
it was not entitled. The United States Supreme Court dealt with
the problem in a case embracing facts similar to those in the instant
case. In U. S. Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Wooldridge,'2 a railroad
company had made a deposit in a bank. The surety company had
given the railroad company a bond to indemnify it against loss by
reason of its deposits, and the same surety company had also given
the bank a fidelity bond to protect it against loss occasioned through
dishonest acts of its employees. The bank failed by reason of the
dishonest acts of employees and a receiver was appointed. The railroad company was paid under its deposit bond. The receiver sued
the surety company for the amount of the fidelity bond and the surety
attempted to set off the amount it had paid the railroad company. In
refusing to allow the set-off, the court held that the bonds were two
independent transactions; that the surety company could not have
bought a claim against the bank after insolvency and asserted it in
set-off; that, even assuming that the claim did relate back prior to
insolvency, the claim only amounted to a right to share pro rata in
the assets; and that it would be inequitable to allow the set-off since
it would defeat the rights of third persons lawfully acquired. The
case appears to be strong authority in support of the decision rendered
in the principal case. A close analysis of it, however, brings out two
9
Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499 (1892); Bank v. Wash. Pay. Co., 94
Wash. 5o4, 162 Pac. 87o (917).
" 0Accord: Wanner v. Wanner, 3oo Fed. 376 (E.D. Pa. 1924); Thompson
v. McClelland, 29 Pa. 475 (1857). See also, Prairie Bank v. U. S., 164 U. S.
227 ( 896).
'Depositors are given a preference by the Act of May 13, 1876, P. L.
i6z, 170.
"268 U. S. 234 (1924).

NOTES

salient distinguishing features. First, there was no specific contract
of indemnity to be considered. The question was decided entirely
upon the rights acquired by the surety by reason of subrogation or
assignment. Mr. Justice Holmes said: "Thus the answer and the
agreement confine the issue before us to the right of the defendant
guaranty company by way of subrogation or assignment." There was
no reference in the case to any express contract of indemnity, nor
does it appear that the court considered the implied contract of indemnity which always exists. Secondly, it is clear that the railroad company in the Wooldridge case did not have any right to priority such
as the commonwealth might have in the instant case.
It might be argued that these distinctions do not constitute a real
difference, inasmuch as it is not likely that the Supreme Court of the
United States ignored the fundamental right of the surety to be
indemnified. The strength of this distinction is likewise lessened by
an examination of a Circuit Court of Appeals case decided after the
Wooldridge case. 8 There, upon facts similar to those of the Wooldridge case, a set-off was not allowed under a contract of indemnity.
The court based its decision on the Wooldridge case and said: "The
provision [for indemnity] did not give the surety company any right
that it otherwise did not have . . . for there is always an implied
obligation . . that the principal will indemnify the surety 14 . . .
The two bonds were separate transactions, totally lacking in contact. . . . To permit the performance of that obligation [the
obligation of the depository bond] to defeat a separate surety obligation would eventuate in an unfair distribution of the bank's assets
among the creditors." It is to be noted that an application to the
Supreme Court for certiorariwas denied.
It is, therefore, quite apparent that there is authority in support
of either view as to the right of the defendant, under the indemnity
contract, to set off the $io,ooo it paid the commonwealth; and, after
a full consideration of the equities involved, a court might well justify
a decision either way by reliable authoritative cases.
Dispensing with the contract of indemnity, what are the defendant's rights to set-off by way of subrogation? It is one of the fundamental and well-established rules of suretyship that a surety, upon
payment of the creditor's claim against the principal, becomes thereby
'Springfield Bank v. Surety Co., 7 F. (2d) 44 (C. C. A. 6th, 1925).
Veigel v. Converse, 21o N. W. 162 (Minn. 1926) is in accord. There the defendant sureties, who were indebted to an insolvent bank, when sued by the
receiver were not allowed to set off payments made by them after insolvency
as sureties on a bond given to secure a deposit of public moneys. The court
based its decision on the Wooldridge case and was of the opinion that it would
be inequitable to allow the set-off. In Fidelity Etc. Co. v. Robinsn, 7 F. (2d)
371 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) a surety company was not allowed to set off a liability
it had incurred as a surety for a bank against a liability it owed the bank
on its fidelity bond protecting the bank against fraud by employees. The
decision was based on the Wooldridge case. See io MINN. L. REv. 443 (1926).
" STEARNS, SuRETYSHn

(3d

ed.,

1922) § 242.
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subrogated to all the rights of the creditor against the principal. 15 It
is necessary, therefore, to determine whether or not the commonwealth had a prior right to payment (it being admitted that there are
sufficient funds to pay such a claim) over other creditors and depositors of the bank; and whether or not such a right will inure to the
benefit of the surety who has paid the debt of the principal. 6
Many courts have decided that the State has preference over
other creditors. This right to priority is based upon the prerogatives
possessed by the State as sovereign. While it is true that all of the
prerogatives of the Crown were not succeeded to by the States, nevertheless, the States did acquire many of them, and this right of priority,
which is for the benefit of the citizens at large, has often been held
to be a right inherent in State sovereignty. Chief Justice Tilghman
wrote upon the commonwealth's right of priority as follows: 17 "The
State of Pennsylvania always took preference to individuals until the
act

.

.

. which directs that debts due the State from deceased

persons shall be last paid. But as long as she held the preference, its
priority was never doubted; and even yet she takes preference with
regard to estates of living debtors . . ." In Booth v. Miller'I it is
said: "The State when acting in its sovereign capacity occupies a
position entirely different and superior to that of a citizen. . . . It
takes preference over other creditors. . . . The State cannot be

deprived of its right by inference, it must be done by appropriate
constitutional or legislative action." "I Mr. Justice Brandeis, in delivering a Supreme Court opinion upon the right of the State of New
York to a preference, said: 20 "At common law the Crown of Great
Britain, by virtue of a prerogative right, had priority over all subjects
for payment out of a debtor's property of all debts due it . . .
The courts of New York . . . decided . . . that the State, as sov-

ereign, succeeded to the Crown's prerogative right of priority, and
=Prairie Bank v. U. S., supra note io, is the leading case holding that the

right of a surety to subrogation begins with the contract of suretyship and relates back to that time and is not inchoate until it pays the debt.
"'The court in its decision did not determine what rights the defendant
acquired by way of subrogation because, it said, if such a right did arise, it
arose after or in connection with the insolvency, and the claim thereunder
would have to be presented in the manner prescribed by the Banking Act.
The question is here discussed without reference to local acts.
"'Commonwealth v. Lewis, 6 Binney 266 (Pa. 1814).

Pa. 297, 85 Atl. 457 (1912).
The State has been conceded this common law right to priority in Georgia: Robfigon v. Bank, 18 Ga. 65 (i855); Idaho: In re Bank of Nampa, 29
Idaho 166, 157 Pac. 1117 (1916) ; Maryland: State v. Bank of Md., 6 Gill. &
J. 226 (1834); Parlett v. Held, 45 Md. 407, 37 Atl. 36 (1897); New York:
In re Carnegie Trust Co., 206 N. Y. 390, 99 N. E. io96 (1912) ; Marshall v.
New York, 254 U. S. 380 (1920); Oregon: Guaranty Co. v. Brammell, lo8
Ore. 261, 217 Pac. 332 (1923) ; Tennessee: Guaranty Co. v. Rainey, 12o Tenn.
357, 113 S. W. 397 (i9o7); West Virginia: Woodward v. Sayre, 90 W. Va.
295, 11O S. E. 689 (1922).
237

"0Marshall v. New York, supra note

29.
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that the priority was not limited to amounts due for taxes, but extended alike to all debts due the State, e. g., the amounts due on a
general deposit of State funds in a bank.2 1 . . . This priority arose
and existed independently of statute. .

.

. The State's right to be

paid out of the assets prior to other creditors does not arise from
an express lien.
In some States the question has not arisen because the right
has
22
been given by statute. A few States have denied the right.
Assuming that the commonwealth has the right of priority, may
this right be passed on to the defendant and be asserted by it? It
has been said 23 that "sovereign powers or rights can only be asserted
by the governmental system or officials." However, the paying
surety, as a general rule, has the right to subrogation, and there seems
to be no valid reason to make an exception to the rule to prevent the
passage of the State's right to priority. This view is supported by
ample authority. In U. S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Carnegie Trust Company 24 it was held that a surety who had paid the
State the amount of its deposits in a bank could be subrogated to its
right of preference. The court there said: "The State's absolute
right to preference in the distribution of assets of the trust company,
if not technically a first lien thereon, was equivalent to a lien . ..
If, as seems to be undoubted, the plaintiff would, upon payment, have
succeeded to a lien, we can see no reason why it should not be held
to have succeeded to the equivalent. No injustice will be done to the
general creditors of the trust company by allowing the plaintiff's
claim to a preference, as it merely continues in force the preferential
right of the State, subject to which all creditors became such, and it
is to be borne in mind that the plaintiff's bond was not given for the
benefit of any other creditor than the State." 25
' In re Carnegie Trust Co., supra note 19.
"Montana: Brown v. Bonding Co., 21o Fed. 844 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915);

New Jersey: Middlesex v. Bank, 3o N. J. Eq. 311 (1879). Contra to Brown
v. Bonding Co., and destroying its effect as Montana authority, are Aetna Liability Co. v. Miller, 54 Mont. 377, 170 Pac. 76o (1918), and State v. Bonding
Corporation, 251 Pac. 151 (Mont. 1926). Both of these cases held that the
State as sovereign had a preferred claim for its deposit in an insolvent bank
and that the surety of the insolvent bank who paid the State's claim was subrogated to the State's right of preference.
" Commissioner v. Bank, 161 Mich. 691, 125 N. W. 424 (1gio); To the
same effect is Brown v. Bonding Co., supra note 22. That case, however, dealt
with the law of Montana which allowed no preference at all, and it is important to note that the case has not been followed in Montana.
" Supra note 19.
See 24 A. L. R. 1510 (1923)

for other authorities which include cases

from Federal Courts, Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New York, North Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court adjudicated the point in Schaeffer's Estate, 281 Pa. 138,
126 Atl. 205 (1924)

where it was said: "Appellee's claim was rightly allowed

as a preference. The doctrine is well established that where the surety pays
the debt of his principal he is subrogated in equity not only to the securities
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It would seem, therefore, (disregarding the intricacies of any
local banking acts) upon the rules of subrogation applicable to suretyship, that the defendant could set off the $io,ooo it had paid the
commonwealth, against the claim owed by it to the bank under the
fidelity bond.
It is not the purpose of this note to delve into the conflicting
equities of the parties concerned. True it is that subrogation and
indemnification are equitable remedies which should never be invoked
when they will operate to cause injustice. However, upon the facts
of the principal case, there might well be a difference of opinion as to
where the greater equities lie. It is briefly submitted, that, if subrogation be a matter of right at all, there is no valid reason to deny the
defendant that right under the facts of the instant case. It is a
dangerous practice to disregard well-settled principles of law unless
manifest injustice is to be the result of adherence to them.
The Pennsylvania Court said the relationship between the commonwealth and the defendant was that of insurer and insured; in fact,
the entire opinion seems to be upon this basis. 26 In support of this
the court stressed two facts. First, the fact that premiums were
received on $6o,ooo worth of "insurance." And secondly, the fact
that the deposit bond was applied for by the bank and that all of the
covenants contained therein were covenants of the bank and not of
the commonwealth. While the corporate surety business is in some
respects analogous to that of insurance, nevertheless, it is fundamentally different. There are three parties to a suretyship contract
and but two to the insurance contract. It must also be remembered
that the premium in insurance contracts affords the sole consideration,
while in surety contracts it is generally but the inducement paid by
the principal for a bond running to the creditor; the real consideration
springs from the contract between the principal and creditor. 7 Thus
the corporate surety cannot evade liability to the creditor by showing
that the principal failed to pay the premium. It is in this instance
that the analogy with insurance breaks down completely. 28 From a
close analysis of the suretyship principles it will also be seen that it
is immaterial that the bond is issued at the instance of the principal
instead of at the request of the creditor; in either case the same
relationship is established and the same rules are applicable.
of the creditor, but to all his rights and priority. Where a party on a distiller's bond pays money to the government on account of his principal, he is
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the government and the claim is
entitled to priority." Accord: Lewis v. Guaranty Co., 144 Ky. 425, 38 S.W.
305 (91i); 37 Cyc. 426.
,See Young v. American Bonding Co., 228 Pa. 373, 379, 77 Atl. 623
(igio). While the trend of modern decisions is to distinguish between individual and corporate sureties, nevertheless, hitherto the distinction has been
more or less confined to other aspects of the problem; generally to the application of the strictissimi juris rule
'STEARNS, op. Cit. supra, § 236.

'American

Surety Co. v. Thurber, 162 N. Y. 244, 56 N. E. 631 (19oo).
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The future will in all probability bring forth an increasing number of cases wherein the surety companies will occupy the anomalous
position held by the defendant in the instant case. It is not likely
that many courts will fail to adopt the view of Mr. Justice Holmes in
the Wooldridge case. It is, however, submitted that the distinction
between the facts of the Wooldridge case and those of the instant
case, constitute such a difference as to warrant an opposite decision.
The decisions of the future must, to a great extent, depend upon the
attitude of the court toward surety companies.
J. D. 2d.

AN

EXPLANATION

OF JURISDICTIONAL

RULES IN ADMIRALTY

TORT -A discussion concerning the admiralty jurisdiction in tort
cases must necessarily begin with The Plynwuth.1 That was a case
where fire, negligently started on shipboard, spread to and damaged
a wharf. In denying jurisdiction the Supreme Court said, "Jurisdiction of the admiralty does not depend upon the fact that the injury
was inflicted by the vessel, but upon the locality-the high seas or
navigable waters-where it occurred. Every species of tort, however
occurring and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas
or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance."
At the time this decision was announced, it was believed both by
the courts and by the profession that a single test for tort jurisdiction
had been established. As a result, for the next forty years courts of
admiralty denied jurisdiction where damage was done by a ship to any
object fixed to land.2
Then came The Blackheath.3 Here a detached beacon, standing
in fifteen feet of water in Mobile Bay, was struck and destroyed by
the alleged negligent operation of a vessel. The Supreme Court,
reversing the district court, held that admiralty had jurisdiction. The
decision was based upon the fact that the injury was to a government
aid to navigation "from ancient times subject to the admiralty," and
only technically connected to the land at the bottom of the sea. Mr.
Justice Brown, in a separate concurring opinion, stated that he accepted this case as completely overruling The Plymouth, and as
"extending the jurisdiction of the admiralty court to any claim for
damages by any ship." The majority of the court, however, refused
to take this view of the decision and insisted that it in no way cut
down the effect of The Plymouth. Mr. Justice Holmes, who spoke
for the majority of the court, said, "It never has been decided that
every fixture in the midst of the sea was governed by the same rule."
'The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 (x865). A. T. Wright, Uniformity in Maritime Law, 73 U. OF PA. L. REV. 139 (925).
'The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361, 368 (i9o4) (Separate concurring opinion
of Mr. Justice Brown).
' Supra note 2.
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At any rate it is evident that the Supreme Court did not desire the
rule it had laid down for wharves to apply to aids to navigation.
With the decision in The Blackheath as a basis, it was not difficult
4
to hold in favor of jurisdiction in The Raithnoor,
where the injury
was to an incomplete beacon in the Delaware River. Location and
purpose of the thing injured were said to be controlling. What effect
these two cases have had upon the development of the jurisdictional
test will be pointed out later.
Upon first examination it would seem that no satisfactory rule
can be deduced from the cases that came after The Blackheath, and
therefore it has been said that the law on this point is in a state of
confusion.
Naturally, each trial court tried to follow the rule it thought the
Supreme Court decisions had established. The process employed was
to examine the facts in such cases as The Plymouth, The Blackheath5
-and The Raithrnoor;6 The Cleveland etc., R. R. Co. v. Cleveland
S. S. Co. and The Troy; 7 and The Poughkeepsie;8 and compare
them with the facts in the case being tried. Having selected from
these the one which it considered most nearly analogous to the case
before it, the trial court made the jurisdictional decision in the former
(the Supreme Court case) govern the result in the latter. Having
reached a conclusion some courts would say that a locality test had
been applied, others that a locality test with its exception had been
used, and still others were content to repeat what the Supreme Court
had said in a number of the above cases, and then announce that the
finding was in accord with the decisions there.
Apparently contradictory results were reached in two recent cases
where the question of jurisdiction was involved. In Southern Lighterage & Wrecking Co. v. U. S., 9 a vessel, by collision, damaged a
cluster of piling in the Mississippi River at New Orleans. The piles
were driven into the bottom of the river a short distance from shore
and were used to keep ships in deep water while unloading. The district court decided that the cluster was in the nature of a wharf and
denied jurisdiction. The decision was affirmed in the Supreme Court
by an equally divided court. Whether the court differed upon the
application of some agreed rule, or whether different rules were con'The Raithmoor, 241 U. S. 166 (i916).
"Supra note 2.
* Supra note 4.
'Where jurisdiction was -denied in the case of injury to bridges, piers,
and shore abutments: Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. R. Co. v. Cleveland S.
S. Co., 2o8 U. S. 316 (I9o8) ; The Troy, 208 U. S. 321 (igo8).
'Where jurisdiction was denied over injuries to an iron pipe extending
above the surface of the water, and being used to make test borings in the
bed of the river: The Poughkeepsie, 162 Fed. 494 (S. D. N. Y. i9o8), 212
U. S. 558 (igo8).
,Southern Lighterage & Wrecking Co. v. U. S., 284 Fed. 978 (E. D. La.
1921), 26o U. S. 699 (1922).
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tended for is not known as no opinion was given. The second case"0
is similar to the first except that the cluster of piling was one hundred
and fifty feet off shore in deeper water, and was used by vessels to
tie up to to avoid dragging anchor in the swift current. The district
court denied jurisdiction, but the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court upon the authority of The Blackheath and The Raithmoor. In both cases there were clusters of piling, in both the clusters
were surrounded by navigable water, in both they had their only connection to land in the bottom of the river, and in both they were used
for ships to tie to. The difference was not so much in the locality or
nature of the piling as it was in their purpose or the purpose of the
vessel in tying thereto. In one they aided the ship to discharge her
cargo, while in the other they provided her with a safe anchorage.
If locality is the sole test of tort jurisdiction, then one of the
cases just discussed must be wrong; and which case is wrong depends
upon the meaning given to locality. If locality of the thing injured
means that it must be in or upon navigable waters not beyond highwater mark, then both clusters of piling would satisfy such a test and
should be included in the admiralty jurisdiction. But if locality of
the thing injured means that it must be in or upon the water, but
having no permanent connection with the land, then neither of the
objects injured would satisfy such a test, hence jurisdiction should be
denied. Southern Lighterage and Wrecking Co. v. U. S. decided that
the cluster of piling was in the nature of a wharf and therefore connected with the land. Perhaps this holding fits into the second meaning given to the locality test. But upon closer examination it will be
found that this is only half true. What the court really did was to
use a nature test to bring these piles into the same category as a wharf
and then to apply the locality test for wharves laid down in The
Plymouth. In Doullut & Williams Co. v. U. S. it was decided that
the cluster of piling was an aid to navigation. Such a holding is not
consistent with any strict locality test, but looks to what some have
called a nature test. But the terminology is unfortunate, for in fact
the test is not one based upon the nature but upon the purpose of the
thing injured.
Other cases in which the courts have reached opposite conclusions are those in which a ship negligently damages a submarine cable.
There are four such decisions in the district courts " which hold that
admiralty has jurisdiction. In each of them submarine telegraph
cables, not connected with water-borne commerce, were damaged by
the negligent dragging of the ship's anchor. The earliest of these is
The William H. Bailey. 2 There a decree in admiralty was given
' Doullut & Williams Co., Inc. v. U. S., 268 U. S. 33
La.).

(925)

(from E. D.

'The William H. Bailey, ioo Fed. H15 (D. C. Conn. i9oo); Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. P. Sanford Ross, 221 Fed. io5 (E. D. N. Y. 1915); U. S.
v. North German Lloyd, 239 Fed. 587 (S. D. N. Y. I917); The Toledo, 242
Fed. i68 (D. C. N. J. 1917).

"Supra note ii.
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without mentioning the question of jurisdiction. In all the next three
cases the question of jurisdiction was squarely presented to the court,
and in all of them the torts were held to be maritime. A sole locality
test (in the first sense suggested above) was applied and found to be
satisfied. The general ground for all three decisions was that the
injury occurred within the physical limits of the admiralty jurisdiction, as the property damaged lay in its marine element. It is true
that the court in Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. U. S. likens a submarine cable to a beacon or a buoy 13 but only in so far as its connection with the land is concerned. The purpose of the cable is determined to have no effect upon the question of jurisdiction. The cable
cases thus far were decided upon the theory that there is a sole locality
test for determining jurisdiction in tort. Whether it was proper to
apply that test must be considered in the light of the latest decision on
this point. In Nippon, etc., v. Great Western Power Co.'4 a steamship negligently dragged her anchor and thereby damaged power
cables upon the floor of San Francisco Bay. The cables here damaged
did not differ from the ones in the previous cases, except that these
were used to transmit electric power for land use instead of messages.
The district court held that the wrong was of admiralty cognizance
and allowed the libellant to recover. The circuit court reviewed the
Supreme Court decisions and reached its conclusion after the manner
suggested above.' 5 Without stating the reason for its decision,
except to intimate that it considered the non-maritime use of the
cables as important, it reversed the district court and denied jurisdiction. It was admitted by the court that this case could not be distinguished in principle from the earlier ones. The effect of this holding
will be seen presently.
Any confusion that might exist in these cases would be done
away with if some general test could be found that would cover all
the cases. Certainly a rule that says that locality is the sole test will
not do this.' The difficulty involved has been pointed out in the
dolphin cases discussed above. When the courts talk of the purpose
for which the injured property is used, they are ignoring the locality
test, and are stressing some other test but not a nature test. The
result is that the rule most frequently announced by the courts-that
locality is the sole test-is most easily overthrown.
It has been suggested that the sole locality test furnishes the general rule, but that there is an exception, namely, objects which are
aids to navigation.' 7 But no court of admiralty would take cogniFed. 1O5, 108 (E. D. N. Y. 1915).
Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Great Western Power Co., r7 F.
(2d) 239 (C. C. A. 9th, 1g27).
Supra page 656.
"For contention that locality still furnishes the sole test for jurisdiction
in tort see G. W. Stumberg, Tort Jurisdiction in Admiralty, 4 TEX. L. REv.
3o6 (1926).
21One court restricted the so-called exception to government aids to navigation: The Baron Jedburgh, 299 Fed. 96o, 962 (W. D. Wash. 1924).
"221

"Nippon
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zance of an injury to an aid to navigation which was on the shore, as
a spur dike extending from the shore or a beacon above high-water
mark.
Another suggestion is that while locality must always be satisfied,
some sort of nature test must also be satisfied."8 But such a rule
would not include the case where one slanders another on the high
seas. Nor would it give effect to the very broad language used in
The Plymouth-thatadmiralty has cognizance of every species of tort
however occurring, whether on board a vessel or not.
No argument is necessary to establish the fact that a sole test of
either the nature of the injury or the thing injured is not the law.
It is submitted that there is not one test for determining the
jurisdiction of admiralty in tort cases, but that there are two tests.
They may be stated as follows:
i. That locality alone furnishes the test in all cases of tort
except in cases involving injury to property permanently connected with the land in any way.
2. That where the object or property injured is permanently
connected with the land in any way, it must satisfy not only a
locality test, but a purpose test as well.
Thus it will be seen that every tort must satisfy the locality test,
and in many cases it will be the only test, but it will not be the sole
test in all cases.
The recognition of some such two-fold test is the only way effect
can be given to two cases so much opposed as The Plymouth and The
Blackheath. 9
Let the tests be applied to the cases in order to check their correctness. In The Plymouth the injury was to a wharf. Under the
second rule such a structure would have to satisfy both a locality test
and a purpose test. Since it satisfies neither, jurisdiction was rightly
denied. In The Blackheath and The Raithmoor2 o the injured property was connected to the land only at the bottom of the sea. But
since it was so connected the second rule applies. Under it both the
locality and purpose tests are satisfied; and jurisdiction was properly
granted. In the two cases involving clusters of piling the second rule
should apply. In both the locality test is satisfied, and the difference
in result may be justified by the failure of one of the dusters to meet
the purpose test. It is submitted that the cases allowing jurisdiction
in admiralty for injury to submarine cables are wrong,2" and that
Nippon, etc., v. Great Western Power Co.,22 in which jurisdiction was
Campbell v.. Hackfield & Co., 125 Fed. 696, 699 (C.C. A. 9th, i9o3);
I8 HARv. L. REv. 299 (io5); 8 COLUMBIA L. REV. 499 (i9O8).
a'Supra note 2.
Supra note 4.
"HUGHES, ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 192o) I98.
"Supra note 14.
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denied, is right. In the earlier cable cases a: sole locality test was
applied. But the cables were permanently connected with the land at
each end, and hence they should satisfy the purpose test as well as
the locality test. Failing t6 satisfy the purpose test, jurisdiction
should be denied.

The first rule'would cover the supposed case of slander on shipboard, 28 of damage to goods falling into the water,2'4 and all the cases
of injuries to persons,' 5 .and likewise it would 'give effect to the very
broad language used in The Plymouth.2'" This double test 'also gives
effect to the language of Mr. Justice Holmes in The Blackheath: 27
"It never has been decided that every fixtflre in the midst of the sea
was governed by the same rule."
It is not contended that the two rules suggested are what the law
on the point under discussion ought to be,2 8 but it is submitted that
they cover and reconcile all the cases.

G.W.D.
EFFECT OF DISCLAIMER CLAUSE )N LIABILITY OF BOND SELLER
FOR ADVERTISEMENT-For the firs time, apparently, a court has

passed on the legal effect of the ofttn noticed clause at the bottom of
bond advertisements that the advertiser does not guarantee the statements made, though obtained from sources believed to be reliable,
when the facts stated in the advertisement are false but not to the
knowledge of the advertiser.- In this case a summary of facts from
a letter of the president of the company, whose bonds were offered for
sale, was printed with a notice that it was such a summary. At the
bottom of the advertisement the following clause appeared in small
print, "Although the information contained herein is not guaranteed,
" It is stated in BENEDICT, ADMIRALITY (5th ed. 1925) 196: "If one of
several landsmen bathing in the sea should assault or imprison or rob another,
it has not been held that admiralty would have jurisdiction of an action for the
tort." While this is true, it is also true that the contrary has not been decided.. Language as broad as that used in the Plymouth, supra note I, would
seem to include even these torts in spite of the fact that they have not the
remotest connection with water-borne commerce.
"Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. City of Monterey, 6 F. (2d) 893 (N. D.
Cal. 1925); 4 TEX. L. REV. 246 (1926).
"If
injury occurs upon the high seas or navigable waters, admiralty
would have jurisdiction: Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U. S. 626 (1881); but if
the injury occurs on land, although caused by a ship, admiralty would not have
jurisdiction: The Mary Stewart, io Fed. I37 (E. D. Va. i88i).
Supra page 655.
Supra note 2.
"It is submitted that.the most desirable rule is that contended for by Mr.
Justice Brown, in his separate concurring opinion in the Blackheath, 195
U. S. 361, 368 (I904), that admiralty should take jurisdiction of any claim
for damages by any ship.
'Continental Ins. Co. v. Equitable Trust Co., 215 N. Y. Supp. 281 (Sup.
Ct. 1926), affirmed without opinion, 219 N. Y. Supp. 793 (App. Div. -927).
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it has been obtained from sources which we believe to he reliable, and
is the information on which we have acted in the matter." In a bill
for rescission of the sale of some of the bonds the plaintiff, a purchaser, alleged that the statements made in the summary were false,
that there was a fraudulent concealment of some material facts, that
the advertising bondhouse had not acted on the information and that
it, the plaintiff, had relied on the advertisement in making the purchase from the defendant. On motion to strike off the bill it was
held that a good cause of action for rescission had been stated, (i) in
alleging that the defendant had not acted on the facts as stated, (2) in
alleging a fraudulent concealment of material facts, (3) in alleging
that the facts printed were false. If the defendant did not act on the
information as printed there was a fraudulent misrepresentation as to
an inducing fact and, as to this, clearly a good cause of action has
been stated. This is also true as to the fraudulent concealment of
material facts. The interesting part of the case is in the holding that,
in view of the disclaimer clause, the repetition in the advertisement
of the false statements of a third party, if relied on, are sufficient for
recovery. This note will be confined to this part of the case.
The heavy weight of authority allows a rescission if one party
to the contract misrepresents, even though innocently, facts which
induce the other party to contract. 2 A fraudulent intent is not necessary because the recovery does not sound in tort. Equity rescinds
the contract in order to relieve the plaintiff from the hardship of a
mistake which was induced by the other party." Does the plaintiff
state a case within this rule?
Leaving out of consideration the clause in controversy, the question first raised by the principal case is whether the defendant misrepresented facts or merely repeated statements of a third party which
were not representations on its part. Most of the cases which have
arisen on the liability of a party for repeated statements have been
actions based on fraud. The majority of these have been decided on
the theory that the party speaking had no knowledge of the falsity of
the statements and, the scienter being lacking, the action failed.4
These cases, however, treat the statements as representations, one of
them intimating that there might be a rescission.3 A few of the cases
2Smith
v. Richards, 13 Pet. 26 (1839); In re Knit Goods Co., 173 Fed.
48o (C. C. A. 2d, igog) ; Pritchett v. Fife, 8 Ala. App. 462, 62 So. iooi (1913) ;

Grant v. Ledwidge, iog Ark. 297, 16o S. W. 200 (1913); Lathrop v. Maddux,
58 Colo. 258, 144 Pac. 87o (1915); Newman v. Claflin Co., io7 Ga. 89, 32
S. E. 943 (1899) ; Bates v. Cashman, 23o Mass. x67, 119 N. E. 663 (1918);
Bloomquist v. Farson, 222 N. Y. 375, 118 N. E. 855 (1918).

:Cases supra note 2.
'Bell v. Morley, 223 Fed. 628 (C. C. A. 9th, 1915) ; Davidson v. Jordan,

47 Cal. 351 (1874); Eckman v. Webb, 116 I11App. 467 (i9o4); Cooper v.
Levering, io6 Mass. 77 (1870); Lams v. Fish, 86 N. J. L. 321, go AUt. 1o5
(914); Kotmtze v. Kennedy, 147 N. Y. 124, 41 N. E. 414 (1895) ; Moore v.

Scott, 47 Neb. 346, 66 N. W. 441 (x896).
'Kountze v. Kennedy, supra note 4.
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allow a recovery in fraud, thereby holding that the repetition is a
representation. 6 One case was for rescission, which was allowed,
also thereby holding the repetition was a representation.' These
cases all would seem to include the advertisement in the principal case
within the conception of a representation. This is reasonable because
the purpose of such advertising is to induce the public to buy the
bonds advertised. The information is not asked for, it is volunteered.
Further, it is well known that the public does rely upon such statements and, it having become a matter of everyday business, the advertiser should be held to have acted in reference to such reliance. The
reasons for holding the statements in the principal case to be representations are certainly stronger than in those cases, cited above, in
most of which the transactions were face to face, between an ordinary
vendor and vendee, and in reference to a subject matter as to which
there was no business policy. There is the further fact that the
advertiser has inserted the clause in controversy. This is evidence
showing that it feared that without the clause there was liability, that
is, the statements were representations. It is submitted that because
of the reasons and cases above the advertisement was a representation.
The question next presented is as to the effect of the clause at
the bottom of the advertisement upon the representations made. The
decisions on the effect of clauses most like the one in the principal
case have been in cases where a principal has sent agents out to sell
land or goods and supplied blank contracts which were to be filled in
and signed in making the sales. These contracts contained clauses,
the general nature of which was that the principal should not be liable
for any representations made by the agent which were not contained
in the contract. Generally the courts have held that the fraud of the
agent afforded sufficient reason to rescind the contract including the
clause." It has been held, however, that the clause acted as a notice
of a limitation on the agent's authority and therefore the principal
was not bound.9 It will be noted that there is no question of agency
in the principal case and so the theory which allows no recovery would
not be applicable to the clause in question. In the cases allowing a
recovery on the theory that the clause, as part of the contract, is
rescinded, though the actions were based on fraud and though the
representations were not made in the same way as in the principal
case, yet the cases are in point in so far as the courts held that the
clause had no effect to prevent the statements made from being representations.
'Hanson v. Kline, 136 Iowa 101, 113 N. W. 504 (i9o7); King v. Loan
Investment Co., 76 Iowa II, 39 N. W. 5o4 (1888) ; Whiting v. Price, 172 Mass.
24o, 5L N. E. io84 (1898); McCabe v. Desnoyers, 20 S. Dak. 581, io8 N. W.
341 (i9o6).
,Hammond v. Pennock, 6i N. Y. i45 (874).
'Jordan v. Nelson, 178 N. W. 544 (Ig2o); Bunting v. Creglow, 4o N.
Dak. 98, 168 N. W. 727 (1918); Shepard v. Pabst, I49 Wis. 35, 135 N. W.
i58 (1912).
'Morgan v. Denton, 28 Ga. App. 88 (1921).
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The clause in the principal case might have any one of three
effects, (i) It might show that the advertiser had no fraudulent
intent, (2) It might prevent the statements from being representations, (3) It might be strong evidence of the fact that the parties took
a risk as to these facts. The effect of the clause showing the advertiser had no fraudulent intent would be important in a suit for fraud
or in rescission based on fraud where a fraudulent intent would be
necessary; but in a suit for rescission based on an honest misrepresentation it makes no difference whether or not the clause affects the
advertiser's intent and this possibility may be dismissed. As to preventing the statements from being representations, the clause really
adds nothing to the notice, otherwise given, that the information was
gained from the statements of another and is not known to be either
true or false. If the advertisement is a representation without the
clause it should be one with it. The cases cited above on the liability
of the principal for the representations of his agent when there is a
clause in the contract attempting to escape liability establish this.
The remaining question is whether or not the clause shows that
the parties intended to take a risk as to these facts in contracting,
There is no reason why the parties should not contract on such a basis.
However, to be binding such an arrangement should not be brought
into existence by fraud. If there were fraud there would be good
reason for the interposition of equity.' 0 In the principal case no
fraud is charged as to the representations made and this possibility
may be dismissed. Where the representations are made in good faith
it is clear that the advertiser who inserts such a clause intends to
contract only on the condition that a risk shall be taken as to the truth
of the statements. Whether or not the purchaser understands this to
be a part of the contract would seem to depend upon whether or'not
the condition has been clearly brought to his notice. In the cases
deciding whether a strike clause is part of the contract made by the
parties, this is the test." If the strike clause is prominently printed
or otherwise brought to the attention of the other party it is considered as part of the contract. If it is not brought to his attention, the
offer made, considered objectively, does not contain the clause. To
the same effect are cases concerning other similar clauses.' 2 The
question would thus be one of fact to be determined by the position
of the clause, the size of the print and the notice taken by an investor
in the ordinary case. The clause in the principal case was typical of
the ordinary one. It was at the bottom of the page and in small
print. These two facts-the smallness of the print and the inconspicuous position-are the important ones in the strike clause type of case.
" Cases supra note 8.
'Summers v. Hibbard & Co., 153 Ill. iO2, 38 N. E. 899 (1894) ; Oakbank
Oil Co. v. Love & Stewart, [1918] S. C. (H. L.) 54.
'Adams Express Co. v. Haynes, 42 Ill. 89 (1866); Sturtevant Co. v.
Film Co., 216 N. Y. 199, Iio N. E. 44o (1915); Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y.
264 (187o) ; Verner v. Sweitzer, 32 Pa. 208 (1858).
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There is the further fact that the ordinary investor relies to a great
extent on the statements in the advertisement paying but little, if any,
attention to the clause. Though this might be hard to prove at trial,
it is a well-known fact and should be taken into consideration in
determining whether notice has been given. The question of fact is
a close one and the answer not free from doubt, but it is believed that
a clause like the one in the principal case does not give sufficient
notice.
It is submitted that, in the principal case, there have been misrepresentations by the advertiser which are not affected by the clause
at the bottom of the advertisement, that the clause is not of such a
nature as to give notice that the parties, in contracting, are to take a
risk, and that the case therefore has been correctly decided.
John H.

EXTENSION OF MANUFACTURERS' AND CONTRACTORS' LIABILITY

TO PERSONS NOT IN PRIVITY OF CONTRACT FOR INJURIES FROM&

LATENT DEFECTS.-What is the liability of manufacturers, vendors
and independent contractors, to persons not in privity of contract, for
injuries caused by defective manufacture or imperfect work? This
troublesome question has again been presented in the recent case of
Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co.' The defendant, as an independent contractor, installed two hoisting cables in an elevator operated in a hotel.
Later, while the plaintiff, a guest of the hotel, was riding on the elevator, the cables separated at their cones, and the elevator dropped
to the basement, causing injury to the plaintiff and other passengers.
The judgment given below for the plaintiff was reversed. The court
held that knowledge, by the contractor, of defective installation, and
lack of knowledge, by the hotel owner, are essential to the former's
liability. Probably on no branch of the law have more comments
been made. However, in view of the growing complexity of the
business world, the conflict of the authorities, and the rapidly increasing number of cases on the subject, much remains to be said.
In the early eighteenth century, before the growth of the factory
system, the more or less simple commercial relations lent themselves
to a restricted liability of the manufacturer or independent contractor.
The leading case is Winterbottom v. Wright.2 There the defendant
contracted to furnish a coach to carry mail bags. Due to latent
defects in its construction, the coach broke down. The defendant
was held not liable to the plaintiff, the driver, who was injured in the
accident. The plaintiff, however, relied on a special contract, and no
duty aside from the contract was alleged. The decision, although it
held only that no liability to a third party arose out of the contract,
has been accepted as establishing the general principle that, a manu'249
2io

Pac. 437 (Utah 1926).
Mees. & W. iog (1842).
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facturer or independent contractor is not liable for injuries to persons
not in privity of contract, even though caused by his negligence.'
Courts adopting such a principle argue that if a person not in privity
of contract could recover from a manufacturer or an independent
contractor for his negligence, there would be no end to litigation, and
business enterprise would be stifled.
To this general principle, well-defined exceptions, which may be
divided into two classes, have been recognized. First, where the
article manufactured or dealt with is inherently or imminently dangerous in kind, a thing whose normal function is to destroy, affect, or
preserve human life, of which the manufacture or sale of poisons,
explosives, firearms, or foods is an example, the manufacturer or
independent contractor is responsible to any person injured by his
negligence. Thus, in Thonas v. Winchester4 the defendant negligently mislabeled a poison and sold it to a druggist from whom the
plaintiff purchased it. The defendant was held liable for the injury
sustained by the plaintiff, because his negligence "put human life in
imminent danger." The theory is, that because of the dangerous
nature of the article, an injury to the ultimate consumer may be foreseen, and there is therefore an affirmative duty of care to avoid the
injury. Second, where the article manufactured or dealt with is not
inherently dangerous in kind, but is rendered imminently dangerous
by the negligence or faulty workmanship of the manufacturer or
independent contractor, he is liable to any person injured by his negligence, if he knew or should have known of the dangerous condition
by him created, and if his immediate vendee or contractee did not
know of it, and a reasonable inspection would not have revealed it.5
Perhaps the best known case illustrating this exception is Huset v.
Case Machine Co.6 In that case the defendant manufactured a
threshing machine for the employer of the plaintiff, who was to operate it. It was necessary for the operator to stand on the covering of
the cylinder, and while the plaintiff was in this position, the covering
collapsed due to a latent defect, injuring him. A demurrer admitted
an allegation that the defendant knew of the defect and the plaintiff
was allowed to recover. In disposing of the case, the court said that
"the act of delivering it to a purchaser with a knowledge and concealment of its dangerous condition was so flagrant a disregard for the
rule that one is bound to avoid any act imminently dangerous to the
lives and health of his fellows that it forms the basis of a good cause
"Standard Oil Co. v. Murray, ii9 Fed. 572 (C. C. A. 7th, i9o2); MOL.
INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS (1910) § 177; 14 IL C. L. 1o7; WHAmON, NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1878) 368.
'6 N. Y. 397 (1852) ; 29 Cyc. 479-480.
'Huset v. Case Machine Co., 12o Fed. 865 (C.C. A. 8th, 1903) ; O'Brien v.
Amer. Bridge Co., nio Minn. 364, 125 N. W. 1012 (igio); Casey v. Bridge Co.,
r14 Mo. App. 47, 89 S. W. 330 (I9O5) ; Wood v. Sloan, 2o N. Mex. I27, 148
Pac. 5o7 (915) ; Kuelling v. Lean Co., 183 N. Y. 78, 75 N. E. 1o98 (igo5);
Berg v. Otis Elevator Co., 64 Utah 525, 231 Pac. 832 (1924).
'Supra

note 5.
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of action in favor of any one who sustained an injury therefrom."
Some courts speak of the defendant's wrong in, terms of fraud.'
Others say that the defendant has by negligence, of which he knows,
but conceals, created a "trap" 8 by reason whereof the plaihtiff has
been injured.
Since the decision in Winterbottom v. Wright, our factory system has developed to unconceived proportions, and the hitherto
personal relation between manufacturer and consumer has been supplanted by the introduction to the commercial world of the middleman
or dealer. Not all courts, however, have recognized that this industrial development should be accompanied by a corresponding development in the liability of a manufacturer or independent contractor to
those not in privity of contract. Those courts which have extended
the manufacturer's and independent contractor's liability have not
done so on any uniform theory. Some have reached the result by
increasing the number of kinds of articles which they will call inherently dangerous, thus bringing cases under the rule of Thomas v.
Winchester.9 In Olds v. Schaafer 10 the plaintiff was allowed recovery for an injury caused by an auto defectively constructed by the
defendant. The court held that a defectively constructed automobile is an inherently dangerous article, and applied Thomas v.
Winchester. Others, while they have extended liability to those not
in privity of contract, have submerged their theory in a discussion of
the application of res ipsa loquitur.11 A few courts, however, have
expressly recognized in their opinions the need of extending the old
rule of liability to suit advanced commercial conditions.' 2 The
decision in Macpherson v. Buick Co."' is noteworthy. There the
defendant manufactured an auto, sold it to a dealer who resold it to
the plaintiff, who was injured, while driving it, by its collapse due to
'Huset v. Case Machine Co., supra note 5; Marquardt v. Ball Engine Co.,
Fed. 374 (C.C. A., 6th, I9O3) ; O'Neil v. James, 138 Mich. 567, ioi N. W.
828 (904) ; Wood v. Sloan, supra note 5; Slattery v. Colgate, 25 R. I. 220,
55 AtI. 639 (903); Zieman v. Elevator Co., 9o Wis. 497, 63 N. W. io2i
(1895).
"Latham v. Johnson [1913] I K. B. 398, 425.
'Coca Cola Co. v. Barksdale, 17 Ala. App. 6o6, 88 So. 36 (I92O) (soda
water); Olds Motor Works v. Schaafer, 145 Ky. 66, 140 S. W. 1049 (i91)
(automobile) ; Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 307 Mo. 520, 27 S.W. 497 (1925)
(soft drink).
"Supra note 9.
uPayne v. Rome Co., io Ga. App. 762, 73 S. E. io87 (1911); Grant v.
Graham Bottling Co., 176 N. C. 256, 97 S. E. 27
918).
"Davidson v. Montgomery Ward Co., I71 Ill.
App. 355 (1912) (saw
frames); Pillars v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918)
(chewing tobacco) ; Macpherson v. Buick Co., 217 N. Y. 382, Ii N. E. io5o
(i9i6) (automobile) ; Collette v. Page, 44 R. I. 26, 29, 1H4 Atl. 136 (1921)
(automobile); Packing Co. v. Clem, i51 S. W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)
(soap); Coakley v.Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94, 195 N. W. 388 (1923) (gasoline
stove).
.Supra note 12.
122
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a defective wheel. It does not appear in the case that the defendant
knew of the defect or that the dealer did not know of it. The decision
allowing recovery stands for the proposition that the liability of a
manufacturer to those not in privity of contract with him is determined by whether or not the article is of such a nature that danger to
others than the immediate contractee is a reasonable expectation if
the article is negligently made. 1 4 The theory of this proposition is
that in such cases there is no break in the chain of cause and effect;
because, as the danger to third persons is to be foreseen, there is a
duty to avoid the injury. The majority of jurisdictions, however, in
accord with the principal case, have refused to extend the liability of
a manufacturer or independent contractor to persons not in privity
of contract beyond limits set by what have been treated as the original
exceptions to the rule.15 Among this class are the Massachusetts
courts. In Pitmanv. Lynn Gas Works 16 the plaintiff, a third person,
was injured by the explosion of a defective gas iron, manufactured
by the defendant. It did not appear that the defendant knew of the
defect. In denying recovery the court held that the liability of a
manufacturer of an article which is not inherently dangerous in kind
is limited to those in privity of contract. The theory is that usually
in such cases a break in the causal connection is found-the intervening negligence of the immediate contractee or immediate vendee in
failing to inspect or repair becoming the proximate cause of the
injury, and the negligence of the manufacturer or independent contractor a remote cause.' 7
It may be seen, then, that when the liability of a manufacturer or
independent contractor to persons not in privity of contract is considered, it is upon the continuity of the causal connection that the courts
differ. It is submitted that the rule providing for liability where
injury to third persons may be foreseen as probable if reasonable care
is not exercised is legally correct as well as commercially desirable,
for whether the thing dealt with is inherently dangerous in kind, or
is made imminently dangerous by negligence, the result remains, that
injury is probable to the ultimate user, whether he is the immediate
1

New York courts have been foremost. See Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y.
47o (1882) (scaffold); Kahner v. Otis Elev. Co., 96 App. Div. (N. Y.) i69,
89 N. Y. S. 185 (1904) (elevator); Torgeson v. Shultz, 192 N. Y. 156, 84
N. E. 956 (i9o8) (aerated water); Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., x95 N. Y. 478,
88 N. E. io63 (i9o9) (coffee urn); Rosenfeld v. Smith & Son, i8o App.
Div. (N. Y.) 69r, 168 N. Y. S. 214 (1917) (steam boiler).- Henry v. Crooks.

App. Div. (N. Y.) ig, 195 N. Y. S. 642 (1922) (chiidren's "sparklers").
"Travis v. Bridge Co., 188 Ind. 85, 122 N. E. i (1919); Larrabee v.
Tent Co., i89 Iowa 319, 178 N. W. 373 (i92o); M., K. & T. Rwy. v. Merrill,
2o2

65 Kan. 448, 70 Pac. 358 (i9o2); Bensinger v. Seaman's, 213 Ky. 157, 280
S. W. 941 (r926); Pitman v. Lynn Gas Works, 241 Mass. 322, 135 N. E.
223 (1922) ; Pelletier v. Dupont, 124 Me. 269, 128 Atl. i86 (i925) ; Tipton v.
Mfg. Co., 302 Mo. 162, 257 S. W. 791 (I924); Ford Motor Co. v. Livesay, 6r
Okla. 231, i6o Pac. goi (I916); Burket v. Studebaker Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150

S. W.

421

(1912);

Berg v. Otis Elev. Co., supra note 5.

"Supra note 15.
",Casey v. Bridge Co., sispra note 5.
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purchaser or not. Certainly where the immediate purchaser is a
dealer in the goods, liability of the manufacturer should not be confined to him; for to him injury by reason of the negligence is most
improbable.18
The decision in Sutton v. Otis Elevator Co. is interesting for two
reasons. First, because by expressly repudiating the rule commended
in the preceding paragraph, and by branding it as having "little, if
any, authoritative support, and still less support in reason," the court
demonstrates the unwillingness to extend the liability of manufacturers and independent contractors, however much commercial developments would seem to demand it. Secondly, because the opinion
distinguishes the situation in which a defectively constructed car is
sold to a dealer and the injury is to his vendee, from the situation in
which the sale is to one for his own use and the injury is to a passenger in the car while being used by the original vendee as a carrer.
In the former situation, says the court, the negligence of the manufacturer is the proximate cause of the injury; as the dealer is a mere
unconscious agent or conduit through which the article passed from
the manufacturer to the sub-vendee. In the latter situation the court
reasons that there is a duty to inspect; and, failure to inspect, or, use
after knowledge of the defect-not the original negligence of the
manufacturer is the proximate cause of the injury. Irrespective of
its soundness, this distinction may be utilized by courts loath to
abandon precedents as a ground upon which liability may be extended
to situations in which the immediate vendee is a dealer. Whether
extended liability be brought about by continuing old rules or
announcing new ones, such a development in the law is a necessary
accompaniment to the advent of the dealer or middleman into modem
commercial systems.
In 1842 when the reason for the decision in Winterbottom v.
Wright was given, modem industry was in its infancy, and there was
a real danger in extended liability. This potential danger to business
enterprise was a practical reason for confining the natural and probable consequences of the manufacturer's negligence to his contractual
privities. But in this day of concentration of wealth and economic
power, there is no such danger to business enterprise. No practical
reason remains for not extending the liability of a manufacturer or
independent contractor to cover all injuries which are in fact the
natural and probable consequences of his negligence. It is submitted
that this so-called modem tendency to extend the liability of manufacturers and independent contractors to persons not in privity of
contract to include all cases in which they know, or should have
known, that danger to third persons was a reasonable certainty if care
was not used is logically sound, and practically adapted to the needs
of a rapidly developing society.
R.B.J.
'For a splendid discussion of the manufacturer's negligence as proximate
cause, and a review of the leading cases see, BoHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW
oF ToRTs (1926) io9 et seq.

